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Abstract—Distribution system operators’ roles are evolving
from a “fit-and-forget” approach towards an active management
of their distribution grid. With this approach flexibility manage-
ment at the local level can defer or avoid costly reinforcements
and have a more efficient use of existing assets. Flexibility tenders
are emerging as a mechanism that allow DSOs to procure
flexibility for the medium to long term. This works proposed a
modular framework to analyze the market rules of local flexibility
tenders for the participation of distributed energy resources
(DER), with a particular focus on demand response and electric
vehicles, and applied it to the case study of UKPN’s flexibility
2018/2019 tender and Enedis proposal for flexibility procurement.
These tenders have been built to allow the participation of
DER, but still there are barriers that may hinder their optimal
participation, especially regarding connection procedures and
baseline definition.
Index Terms—Demand-side management, Electric vehicles,
Local Flexibility Markets, Vehicle-to-grid
I. INTRODUCTION
Distribution system operators (DSO) are facing a challeng-
ing environment with the massive integration of distributed
renewable energy sources (DRES) like wind turbines and PV
panels, and the electrification of new sectors, such as heating
and transport. Ensuring grid reliability and quality of supply
while integrating these new resources may require significant
infrastructure investments by DSOs. However, advances in
information and communication technology (ICT) and dig-
italization have enabled enhanced control and monitoring
of distribution grids and flexibility assets, such as electric
vehicles (EVs), stationary batteries and demand side response
mechanisms (DSR).
In this context, DSOs roles and responsibilities are evolving.
Historically, DSOs have operated their grids through a ”fit-
and-forget” approach, since they did not require extensive
management or monitoring. However, the integration of con-
nected and smart flexible resources offers the opportunity for
Active Network Management (ANM) of distribution grids,
changing the way distribution grids are operated and planned.
The ANM approach can make efficient use of flexible re-
sources at the local level, thus deferring or avoiding costly
infrastructure reinforcements and helping the integration of
renewable energy generation. Considering this, several use
cases for flexibility can be considered [1]:
• Investment deferral: Flexibility can be used to reduce
grid constraints (voltage or current issues), thus reducing
the need for infrastructure reinforcements. This case
requires a medium to long term vision of load (or
generation) and flexibility availability for grid planning.
• Maintenance impact reduction: In this case flexibility
is used to reduce the impact of asset maintenance in
the distribution grid, which can be planned with several
weeks in advance.
• Grid management in exceptional events: Flexibility is
used to manage grid constraints in exceptional events,
for example extreme weather conditions, an N-1 config-
uration or a grid incident. Flexibility would need to be
procured close to real-time.
There has been an increasing interest from European reg-
ulators in the utilization of flexibility at distribution level.
In particular, the Clean Energy Act [2] explicitly addresses
the need for DSOs to procure flexibility. Also, the Council
of European Energy Regulators (CEER), sees the future role
of the DSO as a neutral market facilitator, ensuring a level
playing field for all flexibility technologies. In this paradigm,
DSOs ensure access to system-wide energy and flexibility
markets to all actors and procure flexibility for the benefit
of their grid when needed. To enable DSOs access flexibility,
they foresee four main models:
• Rules-based: In this case flexibility is imposed by grid
codes. For example, voltage regulation or reactive power
compensation for distributed generation.
• Network tariffs: In this case tariffs provide the incentives
to end users to alter their consumption patterns. However
current network tariffs do not reflect the locational and
temporal constraints of the distribution network.
• Connection agreements: DSOs and customers reach
an agreement for the provision of of flexibility, like
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interruptible contracts for renewable generation.
• Market based: In this case, DSOs procure flexibility
from market, either through bilateral contracts or a short-
term market platform.
This last model is preferred by regulators, where flexibility
would be procured in a competitive manner [3]. In recent
years research and several demonstrator projects have taken
interest in market based solutions for flexibility procurement
at the distribution level. Recent examples can be found in the
Interflex project, where a flexibility market to solve intraday
local congestion is being tested in two demonstrators in France
and the Netherlands [4], and SmartNet, that tackles the TSO-
DSO coordination problem, by proposing five market designs
for flexibility procurement [5].
The mentioned demonstrator projects are based on short-
term markets. However, DSOs face high risks if they rely
only on short-term markets to procure flexibility for investment
deferral. Local markets may suffer from a lack of liquidity,
thus exposing DSOs to high flexibility prices, or even endanger
grid reliability, since they have limited options if the market
fails. A solution to mitigate the availability and price risks is
to procure flexibility through long-term agreements [6].
Within this context, UK Power Networks (UKPN), the
London-area DNO, has adopted a ”Flexibility first” approach
towards all new investments in the high and medium voltage
(HV and MV) grids [7]. For this, UKPN has implemented
local flexibility tenders in order to contract flexibility for the
medium to long-term (2019-2020 to 2023-2024 winter season,
when peak load occur), in portions of the grid where they ex-
pect congestions. With this approach, UKPN can exploit cost-
efficient flexibility solutions, thus reducing their investment
costs. This tender process is the first market implementation
of flexibility procurement at distribution level, to the authors
best knowledge, and is expected to be followed by the rest of
the DNOs in the UK.
In the present work, we analyzed distribution flexibility
tenders with the objective of identifying barriers to entry for
DER aggregators and propose possible evolutions of market
design. The remaining of this work is organized as follows:
Section II describes the modular framework for the analysis,
Section III describes UKPN’s local flexibility tender and a
proposal launched by French DSO Enedis, and Section IV
applies the framework to the tender proposal from the point
of view of an EV aggregator. Finally, conclusions are made in
Section V.
II. MODULAR FRAMEWORK DEFINITION
To analyze the market designs for the flexibility tenders,
we adapted the modular framework proposed in [8], which
was used to benchmark frequency regulation reserve markets
in Europe for the participation of DER aggregators. The
modularity of the framework allows to classify market rules
and identify best practices and room for improvement, and can
be adapted to emerging local flexibility markets.
This framework consists of three hierarchical modules:
A Administrative rules, barriers which can completely pre-
vent the participation of DER into the market
B Product definition, which can limit the provision of flex-
ibility by aggregators
C Payment Schemes, which can hinder the economic viabil-
ity of the provision of flexibility services by aggregators
This framework was adapted to analyze DSO flexibility
services, where DSOs procure active power flexibility to
manage grid constraints and defer reinforcements.
A. Module A: Administrative rules
1) Technical discrimination: In the market design there
might be rules impeding the participation of DER aggregators
in the market, or requirements that would imply an excessive
burden for their entrance to market. For example, the aggre-
gation of multiple sites can be forbidden by a market rule, or
connection or measurement requirements might not be adapted
to aggregation of diffuse resources.
2) Inter-operability of flexibility platform: There is a wide
variety of DSOs in European countries. For example, there is
one major DSO in France, Enedis, which supplies 95% of the
territory, whereas there are more than 800 in Germany. Each
tender will procure flexibility for one site, operated by one
DSO only. However, as there could be a potential large number
of tenders (and thus of DSOs), there should be a coherence
and common process between these tenders. Aggregators, who
could control assets across several DSO’s sites, would benefit
from these common structure, reducing their learning process.
B. Module B: Product definition
1) Distance to real-time and availability windows: This
characteristic refers to how far ahead of delivery the flexibility
products are procured. DSOs might need a long-term assurance
of the flexibility availability when planning their grid, as rely-
ing only on a short-term markets might be prejudicial to them,
but on the other hand aggregators of diffuse resources (such
as demand response or EVs) might face high uncertainties on
their asset availability ahead of time.
To reduce uncertainties for market participants, mid or
long term procurement of flexibility may define a specific
availability window in which the flexibility should be avail-
able for activation. Defining specific availability windows,
(for example, corresponding to the expected peak-load hours
instead of whole days), can help aggregators match their
resources availability profiles to DSOs needs. It should be
noted that even though flexibility should be available during
these periods, they may not be (always) activated.
2) Activation time: This refers to the (minimum)
amount of time the product (increase/decrease of produc-
tion/consumption) is activated. This time will depend on the
requirements of DSOs. However, long activation times might
be highly constraining for aggregators of diffuse resources.
For example, an EV aggregator would need to have a higher
number of resources to sustain long activation periods, and
may face higher operational constraints to ensure the mobility
requirements of EV users. Also, since congestion management
services are energy-based (instead of capacity-based services
like frequency response), long activation times might induce
increased battery degradation.
3) Minimum bid size: The minimum bid size will be linked
to how many distributed resource units should be aggregated.
Since local flexibility markets are focused on reduced areas,
aggregating a high number units might be unfeasible. Low
bid sizes will enable the participation of a higher number of
flexibility resources and increase liquidity of the market.
C. Location
Local flexibility products are different from system-wide
flexibility, such as frequency regulation, since the location of
the resource is key in the impact it can have in solving a
grid constraint. Products should have a well defined location,
according to the expected grid constraints, to ensure that
the flexibility resources will have an positive impact in grid
operation.
D. Module C: Verification and Payment
1) Nature of Payments: For long-term flexibility procure-
ment, both reservation (or availability) and utilization pay-
ments are needed. Reservation payments are necessary to
ensure the availability of the flexible resources during the
required availability windows. They are related to the flexible
power capacity (in e/kW for example). These payments may
not be needed in close to real-time markets.
Activation payments refer to the actual utilization of flexibil-
ity, and are related to the energy provided during the flexibility
service (thus, a payment is made in e/kWh).
Remuneration of flexibility for reservation and activation
can be either market-based or a regulated tariff. A combination
of market and regulated tariffs can be considered, such as a
market-based reservation payment and a regulated tariff for
the activation of flexibility. However, ideally both reservation
and activation payments are based on declared bids, thus
allowing to reflect different cost structures (fixed and variable)
of flexibility resources.
2) Baseline definition and verification: Flexibility services
imply a deviation from usual consumption/production patterns.
Thus, it is necessary to determine a baseline upon which the
activation of flexibility is verified. Adapted baseline method-
ologies should be used for diffuse resources, which may not
respond to the same patterns as conventional, more predictable,
resources. This issue has been solved at the transmission level,
and services at DSO level should use this knowledge.
3) Stacking of services: Local flexibility services are not
going to be the only source of revenues for DER aggregators.
Participating in DSO services must not be exclusive with other
flexibility (system-wide) markets, as long as they do not imply
contradictory actions.
4) Environmental bonus: The development of flexibility
services in the distribution level is closely related to energy
transition and the better use of available resources. Thus, using
clean technologies like renewable generation or storage should
be preferred than appealing to fossil-fuel based resources, such
as back-up generators.
TABLE I
MODULAR FRAMEWORK DESCRIPTION
Module Parameter
Administrative rules A1 Technical discrimination
A2 Inter-operability of platform
Product definition B1 Distance from real-time
B2 Activation time
B3 Minimum bid size
B4 Location
Payment scheme C1 Nature of payment
C2 Baseline definition
C3 Stacking of services
C4 Extra Bonus
Fig. 1. Screenshot of Picloflex platform depicting a tendered site and the
flexibility requirements
III. EMERGING LOCAL FLEXIBILITY TENDERS
A. UK Power Networks
In 2018, UKPN presented their Flexibility Roadmap, an
ambitious plan to develop market-based solutions to procure
flexibility for its network. The primary use of this flexibility is
to defer load related reinforcements in their high and medium
voltage network. For this, they set up a tender process to
procure flexibility for identified sites in the grid where they
foresee grid constraints, with delivery starting winter 2019-
2020 (high load period). The tender process started in mid-
2018 with the publication of sites and a bidding period from
December 2018 to March 2019. Results of the tender process
were published in May 2019, contracting flexibility for 8 of
the 27 tendered sites.
A platform, PicloFlex, was used for the tender, where
flexibility sites and requirements where published and the
market participants were able to declare their flexibility assets
and submit their bids, as shown in Fig. 1. It is expected that the
other DNOs in the UK will start their own flexibility tenders
in the upcoming years, using the same platform.
Rules and product definition are described in [9]. The tender
has been built with the possibility of DER participation. How-
ever, connection codes are strict, in particular for generation
and storage assets (EREC G59 and EREC G83) and minutely
measurements are required at the point of connection to the
grid for each flexible unit.
Fig. 2. Availability windows for the 27 tendered sites.
Regarding the products, each site required flexibility for
a defined availability window of a few hours during the
day (most of them during the evening peak time, as seen
in Fig. 2), and for 2 to 5 months during winter. Flexibility
outside the availability windows can be requested by the
DSO, for constraint management in exceptional conditions,
but flexibility providers are not obliged to accept them.
Minimum bid size was only 50 kW, with overall flexibility
requirements for each site ranging between 200 to 12600
kW for winter 2019-2020. Aggregation of different units is
allowed, such as demand response, storage or distributed
generation. Activation is made close to real time, with a
minimum duration of activation of 30 minutes.
Considering payment and settlement, there is a reservation
and an activation payment, both of which are set during the
bidding process. Baselines, to which activation of flexibility
are compared, are defined by the average half-hourly historical
production/consumption during ten reference days defined by
the DSO. This gives one fixed power value (not a profile) for
the whole availability window and the aggregated flexibility
assets. Alternative baselines can be used if suitable, which are
based on recent-observation methodologies: for consumption
sites is based on the average consumption of the previous
five days during the availability window, and for storage or
generation sites it is based on the average export in the half
hour preceding the activation instruction.
Finally, stacking of services is allowed, as long as additional
services do not interfere with the contracted services. Also, no
environmental bonus was mentioned.
B. Enedis (proposal)
Since 2015, the article 199 of French Energy Law allows
the utilization of flexibility for the optimization of distribution
systems. Within this context, in 2018 Enedis launched a con-
sultation process to set the bases for market-based flexibility
procurement [1]. This document contained a proposal for a
tender process, similar to the UKPN approach, where flexibil-
ity would be procured to avoid or defer grid reinforcements
(foreseeable use of the flexibility) or to deal with exceptional
events (unexpected use of flexibility) for their MV grid. The
consultation period ended on February 2019 and a synthesis
was published in June 2019 [10]. Since this is only a proposal
of a market solution, actual characteristics of the process might
be subjected to change.
The tender proposal stated a willingness to be open to all
kinds of flexibility, allowing aggregation of different sites and
stacking of services for flexibility providers. The process will
be divided in three phases: first, a declaration of intention
where Enedis will publish sites to identify potential flexibility
providers. Second, a procurement phase, which can take the
form of a tender if they see a sufficient number of market
participants. Finally, the operational phase, where contracted
flexibility is activated and the settlement and payments are
made.
Flexibility will be procured for defined periods (availability
windows) and with certain technical characteristics (minimum
duration, number of activations, response time). However,
these details are not yet fully defined. Similar to UKPN’s
case, flexibility could be procured outside the availability
windows but market participants will not be obliged to provide
flexibility.
The minimum bid size considered is 500 kVA. However,
Enedis contemplates to accept only full bids (bids that can
satisfy the whole flexibility needs for a given site). This im-
poses a de facto greater minimum bid threshold related to the
grid flexibility requirement. Finally, the acceptance of bids will
depend on both economical and technical characteristics of the
offers. An environmental criteria based on CO2 emissions was
considered at first, but then dismissed after the consultation
period due to complex implementation.
Since flexibility will be procured ahead of time, capacity
and activation payments are considered. While reservation
payments will be subjected to competition, Enedis envisages
to have regulated tariffs for activation payments according to
the technology of the flexibility.
Finally, three baseline methodologies are proposed accord-
ing to the flexibility assets characteristics: consumption or
production sites, above or below a given power capacity
threshold (36kVA).
• Recent observation: Used for production sites and
adapted for controllable generators, the baseline is defined
as the average power produced during a given time before
activation, in this case the 10 minutes preceding it.
• k-nearest neighbors: Used for production or consump-
tion sites, the baseline is defined as the average profile
over k days during which the profile is the closest to the
day of activation.
• Panel method: Used for consumption sites under 36 kVA
(thus, adapted to diffuse demand response), this method-
ology sets the baseline by comparison to a reference panel
of non-flexible customers with similar characteristics to
the ones with demand response flexibility.
The proposed methodologies require more work from the
DSO, like defining a metric for the closest days (k-nearest
neighbors) and defining reliable panels of customers (panel
method) but can provide baselines adapted to diffuse flexibility
resources.
IV. THE CASE FOR DIFFUSE DER: DSR AND EVS
This section aims to identify the main barriers on market de-
sign for the participation of diffuse flexibility resources, such
as demand response and electric vehicles. Table II resumes the
criteria analyzed from the point of view of a diffuse flexibility
aggregator.
Both initiatives state their willingness to allow participate
of all kind of flexibility resources, allowing the aggregation of
distributed flexibility. Also, they both encompass a sufficiently
large area where these tenders will be applied, as the others
DNOs in the UK will follow the same initiative, and Enedis en-
compasses over 90% of the French market. However, they can
still present administrative barriers concerning connection and
measurement. Pilot projects that use bidirectional capabilities
of EVs (V2G technology) have found connection requirements
too restrictive and time consuming, both in the UK and in
France [11]. Also, UKPN’s minute-by-minute measurement
requirement do not align with standard smart meter technical
capabilities, which usually have 30 minute time-resolution,
thus making an extra barrier for demand-side flexibility. Easing
connection process and aligning measurement requirements
with standard smart meter capabilities should be considered
to allow effective participation of all types of flexibility.
Considering the tenders, there is a conflict between the
DSOs need of assurance of flexibility availability in the
medium to long-term and the uncertainty of it by aggrega-
tors. Defining availability windows, ideally of no more than
a few hours, can help aggregators match their availability
profiles to DSO needs. Within this respect, UKPN’s tender
provide a good solution and can provide good opportunities
for aggregators. For example, an EV aggregator can match the
availability of company fleets that are parked after working
hours to provide flexibility during evening windows.
Regarding the flexibility products, they should be adapted
to distributed resources within a constrained geographical area
(limited number of them). The main barrier detected is the
minimum bid size considered in the Enedis proposal, where
500 kVA and full bid constraint are not adapted to a local
flexibility market. On the other hand activation times of up to
30 minutes are acceptable, and are compatible with standard
smart meter measurements.
Finally, regarding the payment and verification, the main
barrier detected are unadapted baselines methodologies, as in
the case of UKPN’s tender. Their baseline definition, based
on the average power on reference days, present the benefit of
simplicity and certainty of the base levels but it is not adapted
to diffuse demand response. Demand profiles from controllable
loads, such as water heaters, heat pumps or EVs, can vary
widely between days due to weather conditions or usage
patterns, and they can get blended with other uncontrollable
loads present in the same buildings. Unadapted baselines
methodologies can hinder the participation of these flexibility
resources, since they might not receive full compensation for
the activation of their flexibility. Enedis proposal provides
baseline methodologies best suited to these flexibility resource.
TABLE II
ASSESSMENT OF THE CRITERIA FOR THE STUDIED TENDERS
A1 A2 B1 B2 B3 B4 C1 C2 C3 C4
UKPN +- + + + + + + - + -
Enedis +- + ? + - + +- + + +-
V. CONCLUSIONS
Market-based solutions to exploit flexibility at the dis-
tribution level are starting to emerge beyond demonstrator
projects, allowing DSOs to make an efficient use of their assets
and thus defer or avoid grid reinforcements. These solutions
need to be designed to be able to make use of all types of
flexible resources. This work proposed a modular framework
to analyze the market rules of local flexibility tenders for the
participation of diffuse flexibility resources, such as demand
response and electric vehicles, and applied it to the case study
of UKPN’s flexibility 2018/2019 tender and Enedis proposal
for flexibility procurement.
These tenders were created to allow different types of
flexibility assets to participate, but can still present some
barriers. The long-term procurement can pose some challenges
considering the need for certainty on flexibility potential
for aggregators, which can be partly solved by proposing
availability windows. Main barriers arise from restrictive and
time consuming connection procedures, specially for storage-
based flexibility resources such as EVs with bidirectional
capabilities, and baseline methodologies that are not adapted
to these kind of flexibility resources.
Finally, it should be mentioned that DSOs have allowed
market participants to participate in the elaboration of these
tenders, both in France and in the UK. Since these markets
are just emerging, we expect that the feedback given by the
first processes and the close collaboration with all stakeholders
will allow an evolution of market rules for the benefit of all.
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